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Abstract:  
The moral status of the human embryo has gained much attention in debates 
over the acceptability, or otherwise, of human embryonic stem cell research. Far 
less attention has been paid to the suppliers of those embryos: people who have 
undergone IVF treatment to produce embryos to assist them to have a baby. It is 
sociologically and ethically important to understand their views and experiences 
of being asked to donate embryos for research if we are to fully understand the 
wider social and regulatory aspects of hESC science. This paper reports on 
parallel studies investigating these issues in the UK and in Switzerland.  The 
studies reveal the inextricable entangling of the social and moral status of 
embryos.  Since donors participate in different discursive domains and contexts 
(public, clinic, family) that shape their perception of ‘what’ an embryo is, their 
views of embryos embody conflicting views and ambivalences. 
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I:  Introduction  
Recent developments in the life sciences have stimulated sociological and 
anthropological interest in the human embryo generally and particularly in its role 
in human embryonic stem cell science (hESC) (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 
Franklin 2006, Parry 2006, Svendsen and Koch 2008). A key question raised by 
hESC science is the moral status of the human embryo and the acceptability of 
deriving stem cells from embryos. A second sociologically and ethically important 
issue is the source of embryos and the protection afforded embryo donors; 
couples undergoing, or who have undergone, IVF treatment (Haimes and Luce, 
2006). This paper contributes insights to both questions with data from parallel 
projects in Switzerland and the UK on the experiences of those asked to donate 
their ‘spare’ embryos.   
Few comparative data are available on either the social implications of hESC 
science or decisions that people are asked to make, during or after IVF 
treatment, in donating an embryo to hESC science: this paper is the first to 
provide such comparative insights. For each study we provide brief details of the 
relevant regulatory context, and then provide indications of the values and 
concerns that emerge when donors discuss their responses. The legislative and 
cultural context regulating the use and storage of embryos is different in each 
country, so this comparative approach extends insights into the broader issue of 
national and international governance of embryonic stem cell research (Jasanoff, 
2005). There are also considerations common to both countries.  For example, 
the IVF clinic is a particular social and physical setting at the medico-familial 
interface, but the introduction of stem cell science potentially changes that into a 
medico-research space. One question is whether, and if so how, this affects the 
social relationships therein.  
 
II:  The UK study:  
Regulatory context: The UK was the first country to allow human embryonic stem 
cell research. The use and storage of embryos is regulated by the Human 
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Fertilisation and Embryology Act (HFE Act) 1990, amended in 2001 specifically 
to allow research on embryos to improve the creation of stem cell lines and the 
development of the treatment capabilities of those lines. Within Europe the UK 
epitomizes a liberal, pragmatic approach to biomedical regulation, though there 
was much debate, with opposition primarily from those who believe that life 
begins at conception and so the embryo should be protected from destruction by 
such research (Deckers, 2007). Four counter-arguments were accepted by UK 
legislators: the ‘argument from suffering’ justifies embryo research because of its 
potential to assist the development of treatments for disease; the ‘argument from 
twinning’ asserts that early embryos cannot be considered human individuals 
because blastocysts can develop into two human beings; the ‘argument from 
capacities’ suggests that since embryos lack the ability to think, act and 
communicate they cannot be accorded full status as human beings, and the 
‘argument from potentiality’ accepts that though the embryo has the potential to 
develop into a human being, this can only occur under specific circumstances 
and therefore it cannot be considered a human being in itself (Deckers, 2005; 
Lizza, 2007). Nonetheless, UK legislators accepted that the human embryo 
should be accorded particular respect (Johnson, 2006; Gibson, 2007) and that 
carefully regulated research should only be allowed on embryos up to fourteen 
days old.  
These deliberations posit two views of the embryo: the first, held by opponents of 
embryo research, that the embryo should be a fully protected life form; the 
second, accepted by UK legislators, that the embryo is a precious resource, 
worthy of respect and protection in its special relationship to human life, whilst 
very valuable for other purposes. ‘Precious’ here acquires two senses: ‘special’ 
and ‘scarce’.  
Empirical study: The UK report is based on research in one clinic. All couples 
undergoing IVF treatment over a specified time period who were asked to donate 
‘spare’i embryos for hESC research were contacted by the social researchers 
approximately six weeks after receiving their pregnancy result to request their 
participation in an interview to explore their views and experiences. Forty four 
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couples were interviewed in depth; most had consented to donate embryos at 
some point though not all consented to the full range of studies and not all 
donated in every cycle. 
Five major themes emerged from this study: (1) how interviewees spoke about 
the embryo; (2) why and how they made the decision to donate or to refuse; (3) 
their evaluations of the consent process; (4) their understandings of the research 
projects they were being asked to donate to, and finally, as a cross-cutting 
theme, (5) the context in which interviewees were asked to donate their embryos. 
Choosing to donate, or not, is a decision positioned in relation to other decisions 
and choices in interviewees’ lives, including, most crucially, the decision to seek 
IVF treatment in the first place (Franklin, 1997). Couples can only be asked to 
donate because they are going through IVF; successful treatment and having 
‘our baby’ is their primary concern and forms the backdrop to the experience of 
being asked to donate embryos. They are, from their point of view, ‘IVF patients’ 
rather than ‘potential embryo donors’. 
The following emerged as key reference points for interviewees’ discussions of 
the embryoii: (i) deliberations over whether the embryo is a baby/child, and 
whether the embryo is a living entity; (ii) distinguishing between eggs, embryos 
and fetuses; (iii) the ‘calculus of conception’ (Haimes 2007): the mental arithmetic 
that couples constantly have to perform when considering the possible 
combinations of treatment outcomes; (iv) the experience of seeing, or declining 
to see, the embryos to be transferred, on a screen, prior to transfer; (v) 
comparing the embryos transferred into a woman with those donated for 
research. We shall focus on the first theme, but awareness of other themes 
shows how complex and potentially variable interviewees’ understandings of the 
embryo are.   
The dominant framing for how interviewees discussed the embryo could be 
termed ‘baby talk’. This is not surprising given the IVF context but neither is it 
insignificant therefore in understanding how the embryo is located in the 
overlapping lexicons of reproduction and research. This is not to say, however, 
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that the embryo was simply seen as the equivalence of a baby; rather, that ‘baby 
talk’ frames the context of deliberations, being the initial and most prominent 
reference point from which further distinctions developed. Two clusters of views 
emerged: the possibility that the embryo is a baby or could be regarded as such, 
either actually or in its immediate potential, and the view that the embryo is 
clearly not a baby, though this in turn often leads to a debate over whether the 
embryo is nevertheless living. These two positions do not represent hard and fast 
groupings to which interviewees could be easily allocated, however; rather they 
were clusters of considerations which they voiced as they struggled to reach a 
settled view.  
‘Baby talk’: An example of the ways in which ‘baby talk’ was the starting point for 
interviewees’ deliberations comes from one couple who nonetheless disagreed in 
their conclusions. The woman said: ‘…I think an embryo is still a baby. I still think 
of it as a baby right from day one. Once they come together and start cell 
dividing, I still think that’s life’.  Her husband’s view was that ‘anything up to 
twelve weeks is really just a mixture of cells, before it starts forming into 
something different’. However, for this woman, the embryo they donated for 
research was ‘unused material, it’s stuff that can’t be put back in us …‘cos they 
don’t think it’s good enough’ (IVF 4:885-990). Although ‘baby talk’ was the 
starting point for their discussion, the embryo was not seen as a baby in absolute 
terms, even by someone who uses this as her initial reference point: a ‘not good 
enough’ embryo is ‘stuff’.  Another said, ‘When I got my treatment they showed 
me my two [embryos] and they were as close as I would get to a baby if the 
treatment didn’t work and I would remember that as being my baby…They were 
what I would class as being my babies…’ (IVF 7: 171-183). This is another 
demonstration of what is regarded as the appropriate starting point for trying to 
express what the embryo means in terms of value and social status, and the 
lasting meaning that it would have, even if treatment failed. 
‘Embryo = baby = life’: Examples of the ways in which interviewees viewed the 
embryo as a baby, and of the belief that the embryo is the start of life or a life, 
follow. One couple described their first reaction at being asked to donate as ‘we 
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first thought we didn’t want anybody to have our babies [laughs] … our embryos’ 
(IVF35:229-232). Another woman for whom there was a close association 
between embryo and baby said ‘to me an embryo’s, it’s like a human, well to me 
it was’ (IVF18:221-223) and later said ‘to me they were like our babies and for all 
that they weren’t, it was just the idea of it’ (IVF18:950-987). Another said ‘I even 
feel a bit funny about having embryos frozen. … [laughs]…I do find it hard to 
think our embryos are in a freezer, really. I think of them as our little lives.’ 
(IVF30:592-622) 
Another woman who was clear about the status of the embryo, though without 
explicitly equating ‘embryo’ with ‘baby’, said, ‘for me life starts at conception, that 
four cell embryo is life’ (IVF32:863-897) and her husband said, ‘I think an egg 
has potential for life but is not life, an embryo is life’ (IVF 32:1122-1132). Another 
woman saw the egg (as well as the embryo) as: ‘It’s always a potential life.  I 
think from a young age I’ve always felt strongly about that. I don’t think I’ve ever 
judged somebody … I’ve had friends who have had abortions, but I’ve always felt 
strongly that it’s still a potential life’ (IVF23:815-827). 
‘Embryo not a baby’: However, a clear assertion of the non-equivalence 
between embryo and baby/child is given by this interviewee (who nonetheless 
spontaneously uses ‘baby talk’ as her primary reference point): ‘And I’m looking 
at the screen at two little circles…and the doctor’s saying, “aren’t they perfect?” 
and I’m like, “yes, they’re lovely”, well, they looked like two little circles to me 
[laughs]. … they put them back in and ten days later you get a blood test to see 
whether they’ve taken and they hadn’t. But I never thought that I’d lost two 
babies,  I thought  it hadn’t worked … for those ten days I didn’t think I had two 
babies inside me. So I wasn’t grieving for the loss of two babies’ (IVF6:376-395). 
Other descriptions of the embryo included; ‘just a ball of cells’, ‘a blob’, ‘it’s this 
tiny little dot’, ‘it’s just a few cells’, ‘just a collection of cells at that stage’.  
‘But is an embryo living?’: However, those who did not consider the embryo to 
be a baby (and for many it was not entirely clear – even those who said they did 
not consider the embryo to be a baby did refer to being aware that it could 
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nonetheless develop into ‘little people’ (IVF36:376-395)) still raised the question 
of whether the embryo is a living entity. One woman was quite clear: ‘Some 
people see the embryo as being a living thing, which to me it’s not. You know, it 
can only live if it implants in me and it’s only as part of me that it can live’ 
(IVF5:754-774).  Another said, ‘I still don’t see an embryo as a life, which is what 
the people who are campaigning against it do. I don’t.  It’s just a few cells’ 
(IVF20:257-301). For most this led to a consideration of what defines life and 
when life begins, as one man said, ‘at what point does a blob, or speck of cells, 
divided cells, become a person? Or when does it become capable of thought?’ 
(IVF39:1144-1231). Capacity to feel pain was mentioned as a possible criterion 
(IVF24), as was awareness (IVF38) but for most who debated this point the 
presence of a heartbeat was the key criterion (for example, couples 20; 25; 38; 
39; 40). 
Struggling between conflicting views: Whilst some interviewees hold clear 
views, for many this question of what the embryo ‘is’ and whether what it ‘is’ 
constitutes life is a cause of much struggle between various viewpoints. As we 
have seen from IVF4 (in ‘Baby talk’) the dominance of one view over another can 
shift during the treatment process. The emotional nature of IVF shapes some of 
their thinking. One woman said: ‘At first I was thinking that a fertilised embryo is 
potentially a baby…So I just thought emotionally rather than logically, it was just 
a collection of cells at that stage, but you think emotionally that it’s going to grow 
up to be … a child…So I was saying, “oh no, I’m not going to have anything like 
that [research], you know the cells cut up”, just because you’re thinking in a crazy 
way. But then, it [IVF] did work and you realised the benefits of research, realised 
we wouldn’t be where we are without the research and without people before us’ 
(IVF31:312-329). The male partner of another woman said: ‘I don’t look at them 
as babies, I think they’re just embryos. Whether that’s to save myself any more 
emotional turmoil, but I think they’re just embryos at the minute, cells...they’re not 
a life yet, just potential’ (IVF30:640-675).   
Another interviewee shares the view that the embryo is not a baby whilst 
expressing the ambivalence that goes alongside this position:  ‘I think you’ve just 
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got to get past the fact and not think of the egg and the embryo in terms of a 
child. You’ve got to still think of it as an egg and an embryo, which is what in fact 
it is. It’s never been given a chance to be a child. Unless it’s planted inside of the 
womb it’s never going to develop into a child and I think you’ve got to basically 
remember that it’s still an embryo and an egg. Yes, if it was given that chance, 
but you made the decision, it’s impossible for it to be given that chance, so why 
should it just be discarded when it can help?’ (IVF7:573-580).  
It is noticeable how much these extracts refer to the emotional experience of IVF 
and indicate the ways in which interviewees persuade themselves, through 
‘logic’, ‘science’, ‘facts’, to think about these questions in a certain way, to 
counter difficulties they are experiencing. It is apparent from this last quote that 
one of the difficulties is balancing the potential of an embryo to become a child 
with the usefulness of the same embryo for research.  
In summary, there are interviewees who clearly think of the embryo as a baby 
and others who are equally clear that the embryo is not a baby (though this 
leaves a puzzle over whether it is a living entity). However these are not absolute 
distinctions because some of those who seem to fall into the second category 
appear to have to persuade themselves to be there. Examination of their 
deliberations suggests that these questions of what the embryo ‘is’ are answered 
in different ways across different stages of the IVF process. However, all the 
interviewees use ‘baby talk’ as the starting point for their considerations and, in 
so doing, are tapping into an assumed shared framework of understanding: that 
this context is primarily about babies. This reflects their focus as IVF patients 
rather than as contributors to hESC research. It is also apparent that these 
interviewees deploy arguments from ‘potentiality’ (and to some extent ‘capacity’, 
but not ‘twinning or ‘suffering’) in their moral and social framings of the embryo. 
For a small minority the embryo is seen as a protected life form; for the majority 
the embryo is seen as a precious resource, though not in the same way as by UK 
regulators. Rather, the interviewees see the embryo as ‘our embryo’ that might 
develop into ‘our baby’ and they are only too well aware, from their knowledge of 
IVF success rates and their own calculations, of how special and scarce such 
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embryos are; their usefulness for research is very much a secondary 
considerationiii.  
 
III:  The Swiss study:   
Regulatory context: Compared to the UK, Switzerland has a relatively short 
history of human embryo research. The Constitution and law give a high degree 
of protection to the human embryo and tightly regulate the procedures that may 
be performed with embryos in IVF treatment or research. Nevertheless, stem cell 
research may use surplus embryos if certain conditions are fulfilled, including; 
that the embryo is not produced for the sake of research, it is ‘spare’ for reasons 
independent of research, and the couple has given voluntary informed consent.  
The possibility of donating frozen surplus embryos to stem cell research has only 
existed in Switzerland since the introduction of the law on stem cell research, 
(LSCR) in March 2005iv. Together with a ban on freezing embryos introduced 
with the law on reproductive medicine (LRM) of 2001v, this effectively creates five 
different categories of embryos, with different characteristics and occupying 
different regulatory spaces: 
(1) the ‘normal embryo’: embryos not created through IVF;  
(2) the ‘IVF embryo’, in existence since the early 1990s; 
(3) the ‘frozen surplus embryo’: these are referred to as ‘old law embryos’ 
(altrechtliche Embryonen), as the new LRM of 2001 forbade embryo freezing. 
Between 2001 and 2005 couples could use frozen embryos for attempts at 
pregnancy; after 2005, they could also donate them to hESC research.  
(4) although surplus (untransferable) embryos generated between 2001 and 
2005 should have been discarded, some may have been cryopreserved (see 
Köferl, 2006). We refer to these as ‘ghost’ embryos.  
(5) ‘surplus fresh embryos’ from current IVF treatment, created by the 2005 
LSCR.  These cannot be cryopreserved for use in future pregnancy; they must 
be either disposed of or donated to hESC research. At the time of writing 
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(December 2007) no fresh embryo donation has taken place as the required 
infrastructure has not yet been established (cf. Mauron and Jaconi 2007). 
This listing illustrates the complexity that is now legally, medically and ethically 
organised around the central concept of the ‘embryo’.  
Empirical study: vi The Swiss study used qualitative methods. We held ‘expert 
interviews’ with doctors and stakeholders to get an insiders’ perspective on Swiss 
IVF procedures and stem cell research. Focus group discussions explored the 
attitudes and opinions of the Swiss public. Finally, we conducted twelve in-depth 
interviews with couples contacted via the IVF clinic who had been asked to 
donate ‘frozen surplus old law embryos’.  
These couples had received a letter from a stem cell research team unconnected 
with the IVF clinic, asking them to consider embryo donation to research. The 
request therefore arose months or years after the end of IVF treatment. 
Approximately half the couples interviewed had decided to donate their frozen 
surplus embryos to research. 
Six major themes emerged in the Swiss study: (1) interviewees’ talk about their 
IVF embryo, (2) decision-making around donation to stem cell research, (3) 
psychological and physical impact of IVF procedures, (4) split between medical 
and domestic discourses, (5) making sense of the IVF and stem cell research 
processes, and (6) shame/secrecy about IVF and consequently about donation. 
This list demonstrates that the regulatory background, and therefore the 
responses of the Swiss interviewees, differs from the UK study. Compared to UK 
interviewees, the Swiss couples were making a different kind of decision in a 
different context: should they give a frozen embryo to research, use it to attempt 
another pregnancy, or discard it? 
Here we focus on topics within the first two themes only, which illustrate the 
couples’ views of their embryo from past treatment.  
‘Are IVF embryos and babies different?’ Some interviewees seem to have 
been unsure at the beginning of the IVF treatment whether the end product 
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would be a baby like others. Markus said: ‘Will we have to look a bit differently at 
our children, because they were created in this way, or are they just children like 
all other children?’vii  He emphasised that his uncertainty was created because 
‘test tube babies’ are discussed as something strange. At the time of IVF, none of 
our interview participants personally knew of other IVF children, and hence the 
lack of public discussion was compounded by unfamiliarity. Heike highlighted the 
absence of public discussion: ‘Our first attempts at IVF we kept strictly to 
ourselves… At that time people really did not talk about it in public.’ Some of our 
interviewees commented they had not even told their own families. After starting 
to feel more self-confident about undergoing IVF, Ina began to talk more openly 
about IVF. In doing so she invented a new, positive identity for her IVF babies: 
‘More and more people are having problems with getting children in the normal 
way, and that means IVF is the scenario of the future now. And that’s why we 
began to call them “future babies”’.  She contrasts them with children obtained 
the ‘normal’ way, but normalises their difference within a normality of the future.  
‘Images of the IVF embryo’: The couples’ perspective on the embryo and the 
hoped-for baby changed in the course of treatment. Familiarity meant they 
became more positive both about the IVF process and the entity they were 
generating. This was particularly the case when they were able to see their 
embryos (this was not possible for all IVF patients). As Ina’s husband Gerd 
explains: ‘So we could see in the microscope how that really looked. Our son as 
cells! Or, perhaps better, as an egg, as a fertilised egg cell.’ This also shows the 
confidence with which couples adopted medical terminology to talk about their 
IVF embryo. This was a common feature in the interviews.  Couples used 
medical vocabulary about the embryo in contexts of IVF procedures, freezing or 
donation, and tended to keep ‘baby talk’ for imagining their future child.  
Several parents clearly expressed the perception that the moment of nidation 
(implantation of the conceptus into the uterus lining) marked a significant change 
between the status of ‘IVF entity’ and ‘my baby’. Once the pregnancy was 
confirmed, the entity ‘embryo’ was thus shifted to another level in the parents’ 
perception. Markus: ‘So I think that up until the moment where we knew it was 
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positive, everything still was relatively technical for us...But I think from that 
moment on where you knew that something was growing there, the technical 
side fell away.’ He continues: ‘So I think that then our image of it changed, it was 
no longer a test tube baby, it was now our baby.’  
‘Imagining the frozen embryo’: In discussing donation the couples had to 
develop a way of talking about their frozen embryo: what it might ‘look like’, and 
what kind of entity they should consider it to be. Is an embryo, during freezing 
and after, the same as a fresh one? Maria imagined her frozen embryo not as a 
separate entity but as somehow still continuous with the couple: ‘No, no, they 
were not children of us, it was a part of us… that was asleep, in a manner of 
speaking.’  ‘Part of us’ suggests both a dormant body part, and a symbolisation 
of the relationship between herself and her partner. Katharina imagined her 
frozen embryo as an Eskimo, though she was very unsure of its status as a 
‘person’: ‘And we still had fertilised eggs, we called them “Eskimöli” (little 
Eskimos)…A mixture of maybe clumps of cells and personal relationship. So, but 
really still not a person, not a foetus, not at all, but a potential person, a kind of 
mixture, a little Eskimo.’  
‘Reasons for donating’: If they did not want to attempt another pregnancy, 
couples had to decide whether to give their frozen embryos to stem cell research 
or dispose of them. In order to donate, they had to see donation as morally 
preferable to, or at least no worse than, disposal. The commonest explanation for 
choosing donation was of ‘getting something good’ out of failure or ‘rescuing’ a 
waste. Sarah says: ‘Just thawing it and throwing it away seemed … a 
waste…When we [she and her husband] have already created life... , then this is 
maybe our act of atonement, a small way of making something meaningful out of 
it.’  For Sarah donation was meaningful because ‘I think basic research is 
important.’  
None of our participants expressed resistance to the idea of disposal on the 
grounds of the embryo’s moral status.  In fact several indicated that donation and 
disposal are only morally possible because for them this frozen entity does not 
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have the same status as an embryo or foetus. Katharina points out: 
‘Nevertheless I could happily give them to research, and I could do that because 
they were not yet real people, they were not beings with souls... ‘. She is taking 
the view that at some point they would become persons, but have been frozen 
before that point is reached. They could reach the same moral status in the end, 
but not while frozen. 
It seems that by donating spare frozen embryos to research, interviewees could 
increase the significance of that entity (make it more precious, in the sense of 
valuable). By turning the spare embryo into a gift they increase its meaning.  
Donation gives the embryo meaningful social status as a contribution to a 
worthwhile endeavour, rather than being a meaningless piece of waste tissue. 
In summary, Swiss couples who are asked to donate fresh embryos or their 
frozen ‘old law’ embryos, face the task of reconstructing their understanding of 
the embryo and their moral relationship with it in this new situation. Both the 
‘donated embryo’ and the ‘embryo donor’ are new social categories for 
Switzerland (Scully and Rehmann-Sutter, 2006). Hence we suggest that much of 
the ‘embryo talk’ of the parents donating frozen embryos is directed at carving 
out these new categories. It differs from the UK data in part because of this, and 
in part because the donation decision is not taking place in the therapeutic 
context of ongoing IVF as in the UK.  
 
 
IV:  Comparative analysis and comment  
 (i) socio-cultural regulatory context: 
In the UK there has been a steady expansion of treatment options in assisted 
conception and of reproductive and stem cell science. In Switzerland, regulation 
has developed more unevenly: at first permissive towards reproductive 
technology (though still less so than UK), then more cautious, and also cautious 
towards human embryonic research. The Swiss law permitting embryo donation 
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for stem cell research is a narrow window of ‘permissiveness’ for a highly specific 
purpose, in contrast to the broader liberality of the UK, which continues to 
contemplate other ways of providing the scarce reproductive resources (eggs 
and embryos) so central to hESC research. However, what is evident from both 
regulatory and cultural contexts is that the embryo has to be posited as a 
particular sort of entity, in order for both IVF and hESC research to expand. This 
is most clear in Switzerland with its five fold typology, but even in the UK the 
‘precious resource’ that is the embryo depends on a double interpretation of that 
phrase, and needs to be understood alongside a third entity, the embryo as the 
‘start of life’.  
(ii) transformation of the treatment context: 
For interviewees in both countries, the social space of the clinic has been 
transformed from one of treatment to one of treatment-research, thereby 
affecting what Thompson (2005) terms the ‘ontological choreography’ of the 
clinic. For the UK interviewees this happened as part of the IVF process, for the 
Swiss it occurred retrospectively: frozen embryos that had been produced for 
treatment were now seen as potential research material. Whilst the extent and 
impact of the transformation differed (for the UK interviewees IVF remained the 
dominant ‘definition of the situation’) it presented all interviewees with the task of 
re-examining their views of their embryos, and of embryos in general. It also 
required them to construct new definitions of their own role, from IVF patients to 
also being embryo donors. None was able to articulate these transformations 
easily, and all struggled (to varying extents) with the conceptual, moral and social 
distinctions that such deliberations required. 
(iii) timing and location of request to donate: 
This aspect constitutes a crucial difference between the experiences of UK and 
Swiss interviewees. First, the request is made in a different social space for the 
two cohorts (the clinic for the UK, the domestic for the Swiss); second, the timing 
is very different, since the UK interviewees were asked during the treatment 
process (though not by a member of the clinical team, it should be stressed) 
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whereas the Swiss were asked some years after treatment; third, they were 
asked to donate different types of embryos (fresh / frozen); fourth, the legal and 
clinical definition of these embryos as ‘spare’ differs between the two countries; 
fifth, the social status of those asked to donate, at the time of the request, is very 
different: in the UK they are still IVF patients, in Switzerland they are ex-IVF 
patients. Consequently each cohort has a markedly different relationship to the 
personnel requesting the donation: in the UK it is a face-to-face relationship 
(though no interviewee suggested there was inappropriate pressure to donate); 
for the Swiss it is a distant, written link with known or unknown others. Thus the 
social context and therefore meaning of the deceptively simple phrase, ‘the 
request to donate embryos for hESC science’ constitutes a radically different 
experience in each country. This in turn has an impact on interviewees’ 
deliberations. 
(iv) embryos and babies: 
It is clear that the UK interviewees saw a much closer overlap between embryos 
and babies and struggled with the consequences of this, whereas the Swiss 
cohort drew clearer distinctions between them. This would appear to be at least 
one consequence of the very different social context of the request to donate. 
That the two entities (‘embryo’/’baby’) nevertheless had to be considered in 
relation to each other by both cohorts (whether in asserting their sameness or 
their difference) is a marker of the strength of this association even in its denial, 
and of the dominant framing of IVF (rather than hESC research), the aim of 
which, after all, is to have a baby.  
(v) multiple definitions of the embryo: 
Both studies reveal a multiplicity of definitions, identities and meanings of the 
embryo held by interviewees, legislators and ethicists. Across these different 
discursive domains we can see differences between: ‘the embryo’ as an 
abstraction with an emblematic moral status; ‘an embryo’ which could be any 
particular embryo that results from IVF process; and ‘our embryo’ which is the 
embryo produced through IVF and imbued with particular social and moral values 
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by the couple being treated (because ‘our embryo’ might become ‘our baby’). For 
IVF patients, the treatment process itself introduces an additional layer of 
variability and changing definitions of the embryo, not least between fresh and 
frozen embryos. Fresh embryos move very quickly through a number of physical 
spaces and social definitions; frozen embryos, by contrast, are fixed in a specific 
physical location and social identity until they are required for treatment, or hESC 
research.  While neither set of interviewees invokes established ethical principles 
concerning the moral status of the embryo (although echoes of these can be 
heard in what some say) they do use moral framings in working their way through 
the variable social statuses they (and legislators and ethicists) ascribe to 
embryos. One strong (moral and social) framing is the wish not to see this 
precious entity ‘go to waste’. 
 
V:  Concluding comments  
Our original question was; what is an embryo? These two studies reveal that 
embryos are not fixed, universal biological entities but are defined by, and acted 
upon in relation to, their social contextviii; that is, by their location in time and 
space. This includes both personal time (which stage interviewees are at in their 
treatment process and in their parenting project) and space (whether the 
embryos are embodied (Haimes, 2003), in the clinic as fresh embryos or in the 
freezer as frozen embryos) and socio-cultural time and space (in relation to 
legislation and to past, current and projected future developments in science and 
assisted conception). Thus the embryo is both socially and morally positioned in 
relation to a number of other key spaces and places (clinics, bodies, freezers, 
stem cell banks, laboratories, parliamentary chambers, homes and so on), and is 
itself a space filled with social and moral meanings and statuses (personal, 
familial, clinical, legal, ethical, cultural, historical). Stem cell science adds to this 
diversity by increasing awareness of the fluidity of the status of the embryo by 
introducing further uses for it, and by reinforcing the view that it is a particularly 
precious resource. 
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Therefore, any answer to our question has to acknowledge this inextricable 
entangling of the moral and social status of embryos. Equally it is not possible to 
have an effective debate about the acceptability of embryo research if discussion 
is restricted to the moral status of the abstract embryo; the real physical entities 
that reside in the freezer, clinic and women’s bodies need to be considered. The 
donors’ perspectives show that the moral signature of the embryo can shift 
according to the stage in the processes (in the body, in the clinic and in the 
laboratory) and in specific practical and normative contexts. For the parents, the 
status of the embryo cannot be extracted from theory and applied to their case. 
For them, real embryos embody conflicting views and ambivalences that are 
ethically pertinent. 
The request to donate embryos forces potential and actual donors to confront 
this question of ‘what is an embryo?’ They have to deal practically with the 
variable, multivalent embryo that straddles categories and contexts, the embryo 
that is both donated and frozen, as well as the embryo that might at some point 
in the future be the beginning of their child. It is only appropriate therefore that 
legislators, ethicists, clinicians and scientists should consider their views of 
embryos. Whilst respect for the human embryo is important, so too is respect for 
those human agents who have to deliberate over the provision of those embryos.  
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i The designation of embryos as ‘spare’ is a simplification of the process whereby they 
become available for research and is a label that requires further analysis.   
 
ii Interviewees were never asked directly about their views on the ‘moral status’ of the 
embryo nor whether they thought the embryo was a human entity or the start of life, 
since we were interested in whether these associations arose spontaneously in the 
interview and if so, in what ways. 
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iii There is a suggestion here of ‘ethical side-effects’ or ‘after-effects’ of donating, for 
some donors, which requires a much more detailed analysis.  
 
iv LSCR, Federal law on research with embryonic stem cells (Bundesgesetz über die 
Forschung an embryonalen Stammzellen, official abbreviation StFG). 
 
v LRM, Federal law on reproductive medicine (Bundesgesetz über die medizinisch 
unterstütze Fortpflanzung, official abbreviation FMedG) 
 
vi The UK study was funded in advance of the Swiss study.  Though its design helped to 
inform that of the Swiss study, the two projects were funded and conducted 
independently of each other. To emphasise the independence of the studies we have 
retained their distinctive voices and methods of anonymising the interviewees. 
 
vii All interview quotes translated from German by JLS. 
 
viii A similar observation was made by Parry (2006). 
 
